The Federal Reserve’s Financial Crisis Response B: Lending & Credit Programs For Primary Dealers by Wiggins, Rosalind Z et al.
Journal of Financial Crises 
Volume 2 Issue 2 
2020 
The Federal Reserve’s Financial Crisis Response B: Lending & 
Credit Programs For Primary Dealers 
Rosalind Z. Wiggins 
Yale Program on Financial Stability 
Patricia C. Mosser 
Columbia University, School of International and Public Affairs 
Andrew Metrick 
Yale University 
Follow this and additional works at: https://elischolar.library.yale.edu/journal-of-financial-crises 
 Part of the Economic History Commons, Economic Policy Commons, Finance Commons, 
Macroeconomics Commons, and the Policy History, Theory, and Methods Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Wiggins, Rosalind Z.; Mosser, Patricia C.; and Metrick, Andrew (2020) "The Federal Reserve’s Financial 
Crisis Response B: Lending & Credit Programs For Primary Dealers," Journal of Financial Crises: Vol. 2 : 
Iss. 2, 67-93. 
Available at: https://elischolar.library.yale.edu/journal-of-financial-crises/vol2/iss2/3 
This Case Studies is brought to you for free and open access by EliScholar – A Digital Platform for Scholarly 
Publishing at Yale. It has been accepted for inclusion in Journal of Financial Crises by an authorized editor of 
EliScholar – A Digital Platform for Scholarly Publishing at Yale. For more information, please contact 
elischolar@yale.edu. 
The Federal Reserve’s Financial Crisis Response B: 
Lending & Credit Programs For Primary Dealers1 
Rosalind Z. Wiggins2 
Patricia C. Mosser3 
Andrew Metrick4 
 
Yale Program on Financial Stability Case Study 2015-1B-V2 
July 1, 2015; Revised: July 15, 2020 
Abstract 
Beginning in the summer 2007 the Federal Reserve (the Fed) deployed numerous 
conventional and innovative programs to address the credit crisis occurring in the wholesale 
lending markets that was beginning to affect the broader financial markets and threaten the 
economy at large. Two of those programs, the Term Securities Lending Facility (TSLF) and 
the Primary Dealer Credit Facility (PDCF) were aimed at providing liquidity to primary 
dealers and required the Fed to rely on its authority under Section 13(3) of the Federal 
Reserve Act. Section 13(3) is a Depression Era amendment that permits the Fed expanded 
powers in “unusual and exigent” circumstances, which it had not invoked in 76 years. We 
discuss the TSLF and the PDCF and the impact that these programs had on the Fed’s efforts 
to combat the brewing crisis, to provide much needed liquidity to the primary dealers, and 
to help revive the wholesale lending markets. 
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1.  Introduction 
On August 9, 2007, the French bank BNP Paribas5 announced that it was suspending 
redemptions from two of its investment funds which held substantial portfolios of subprime 
mortgages because of an inability to value the funds. This announcement set off a panic 
among investors leading to a sudden contraction in lending as institutions pulled back from 
any elements with increased risk. The downturn in the subprime mortgage market quickly 
collapsed the asset-backed commercial paper (ABCP) market and then spread to other 
elements of the wholesale funding markets, including the significant repurchase agreement 
(repo) market that was, critical to nonbank institutions. Soon, banks and other financial 
institutions were experiencing difficulty meeting their funding needs.  
In response, the Federal Reserve (the Fed) deployed numerous conventional and innovative 
programs to add liquidity to the markets. It began by using its conventional monetary policy 
tools as lender of last resort, the federal funds rate, and the discount rates applicable to 
wholesale lending by depository institutions. By early 2008, however, it had become 
increasingly concerned about the nonbank primary dealers, such as the five major 
investment banks. On March 7, 2008, the Fed announced a series of 28-day term-repo loans, 
particularly for agency mortgage-backed securities (MBS), under its standing Open Market 
Operations (OMOs) authority to provide primary dealers the longer-term funding that the 
markets were not providing.  
Next, on March 11, the Fed announced the Terms Securities Lending Facility (TSLF), which 
would lend Treasury securities to the primary dealers in exchange for illiquid securities, 
thereby providing a pair of funding mechanisms similar to those available to depository 
institutions in the Discount Window and the Term Auction Facility. However, on March 16, 
2008, with the collapse of Bear Stearns—the fifth largest investment bank—imminent but 
for the merger with JP Morgan Chase that was facilitated by Fed loans, the Fed also 
announced the Primary Dealer Credit Facility (PDCF), pursuant to which the Fed would 
provide secured loans directly to the primary dealers. In the case of both the TSLF and the 
PDCF, the Fed had to rely on its emergency authority under Section 13(3) of the Federal 
Reserve Act (FRA)6, a provision rarely used.  
Despite these efforts to increase liquidity, the wholesale markets continued to be 
constrained and then worsened. On September 15, 2008, Lehman Brothers, the fourth 
largest investment bank, announced that it had filed for bankruptcy protection, initiating the 
largest such action in U.S. history. A tsunami of panic cascaded throughout the financial 
markets. In response, the Fed announced that it was significantly expanding the terms of 
both the TSLF and the PDCF to provide continued liquidity. In total, between the two 
facilities, the Fed provided a total of $383 billion to the primary dealers (maximum amount 
_____________________________________________________________________ 
5 A U.S. subsidiary of BNP Paribas, BNP Paribas Securities Corp., which conducted business as a broker-dealer, 
was also a primary dealer.  
6 12 U.S. Code Section 343—Discounts of obligations arising out of actual commercial transactions, as amended.  
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outstanding), a total that rises to $463 billion when the amounts borrowed under the Single-
Tranche Repos are added. 
In this case, we examine these efforts by the Fed to provide liquidity to primary dealers. We 
examine the Fed’s use of its traditional repo powers and then focus on the TSLF and the 
PDCF, their designs, and the reasons for their implementation. Further, we consider what 
alternatives the Fed may have had and whether the programs achieved their intended 
impact. Section 2 discusses briefly the severe contraction in wholesale lending markets that 
began in late 2007 and evolved into the financial crisis; Section 3 explains the critical role of 
the primary dealers in monetary policy and the financial system; Section 4 provides an 
overview of the Fed’s powers under Section 13(3) of the FRA; Section 5 discusses the Single-
Tranche Repos; Section 6 considers the TSFL in detail; and Section 7 discusses the PCDF in 
detail.  
Questions 
1. Did the PDFC and the TSLF serve the purposes that the Fed intended? 
2. Were there other types of programs that the Fed could have implemented given its 
objectives? 
3. Would the Federal Reserve be able to implement the same programs today? If not, 
what type of response could it provide? 
4. What elements of the programs were designed to address issues of stigma? Were 
these measures adequate?  
5. Do you agree with the Fed’s conclusions that the requirements of Section 13(3) were 
met with respect to the TSLF and the PDCF?  
6. What new risks did the Fed assume in lending to the primary dealers under these 
programs? How did the programs seek to manage these increased risks? 
 
2. The Crisis in the Wholesale Lending Markets 
By the early 2000s, unregulated shadow banking, in which financial institutions loan funds 
among themselves, had grown to be a significant portion of the U.S. financial lending markets. 
This fact was to greatly impact the contagion effects of the crisis and would also play an 
important role in the Fed’s ability to stem the crisis. (See Gorton and Metrick 2012 for further 
discussion of the shadow banking system.) 
As shown in Figure 1, a 2004 bond association survey revealed that the wholesale secured 
lending and borrowing markets totaled $7.8 trillion with roughly half (49%) being bilateral 
repo, 17% tri-party repo, and 30% securities lending. U.S. broker-dealers accounted for 
40.6% of this wholesale market, investment managers and hedge funds another 9%. (See 
Figure 2.)   
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Figure 1: Secured Borrowing and Lending Markets, June 30, 2004 
Source: Gorton and Metrick 2012, 18. 
These wholesale lending markets played a significant role in the interconnected financial 
markets. In particular, repos constituted 38 percent of the short-term financing of broker-
dealers at the end of 2007 (Adrian, Burke, and McAndrews, 2009, 2). By contrast, repos were 
less than 10 percent of the financing of commercial banks where deposits represented 59 
percent of their liabilities (Ibid.). 
Figure 2: Participants in the Bilateral Repo Market, June 30, 2004 
Source: Gordon and Metrick 2012, 18. 
By late 2007, after the first troubles sparked by the downturn in the subprime mortgage 
market were experienced—notably Bear Stearns closed one of its funds and BNP Paribas 
halted redemptions on three of its funds because it could not value them—panic about 
subprime mortgages began to spread far and fast through the wholesale lending markets.  
Type $ millions Percent of Total 
Bilateral Rep 3,857,740 49% 
Tri-party Repo 1,350,000 17% 
Securities Lending 2,355,413 30% 
NASD/NYSE 275,148 4% 
Total 7,838,301 100% 
Type of Counterparty $ millions % of Total 
U.S. Dealers 1,566,276 40.6% 
U.S. Investment Managers, Hedge Funds 348,393 9.0% 
Other U.S.  21.4% 
Subtotal U.S. Counterparties 2,738,523 71% 
   
Off-Shore Hedge Funds  318,920  8.3% 
Other Non-U.S. Counterparties 800,298 20.7% 
Subtotal Non-U.S. Counterparties 1,119,218 29% 
   
Total All Counterparties 3,857,741 100.0% 
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The tri-party repo market was particularly vulnerable because of two usage patterns that 
had developed in the years preceding 2008. First, dealers were increasingly pursuing high-
leveraged strategies and financing long-term assets with short-term funding. The percentage 
of overnight repo funding utilized by brokers, including primary dealers, had steadily 
increased from around 50 percent prior to 2004, to a high of 75 percent in 2008. Outstanding 
overnight repos grew from $450 billion in July 1994 to $3 trillion in March 2008 right after 
the creation of the PDCF (Ibid., 9). 
Secondly, the quality of securities used as collateral for repos had been declining to 
encompass less-liquid types of securities in greater proportion. The use of less-liquid types 
of collateral, such as structured securities, below investment-grade corporate debt and 
equities, whole loans, and trust receipts, increased the risk associated with a possible failure 
that might force the sale of such assets (Ibid.). 
Problems in the subprime mortgage market spread to other mortgage markets and then to 
wholesale lending markets. Haircuts on repo collateral began to rise and ABCP issuers had 
trouble rolling over their outstanding paper.  
Money market mutual funds (MMMFs), which were major holders of ABCP, faced pressure 
to maintain their $1 par value, and several required funding support from their sponsors in 
order to do so (Gorton and Metrick 2012, 5-6). These pressures prompted many MMMFs and 
other short-term investors to retreat from ABCP. As shown on Figure 3, the impact was 
significant; a $1 trillion reduction in outstanding ABCP occurred between late 2007 and 2009 
(Covitz and Surez 2013). 
Figure 3: Financial and Asset-Backed Commercial Paper Outstanding (seasonally adjusted) 
 
Source: Gorton & Metrick 2012, 15. 
MMMFs were also the main U.S. funders of repos7, which many banks and nonbank financial 
institutions (such as investment banks, and broker-dealers) depended on to finance their 
_____________________________________________________________________ 
7 “A repo contract is an arrangement in which one party, the depositor or lender, provides cash to the other 
party, the borrower or bank. The contract is often overnight and is collateralized. So, the borrowing bank 
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operations. By the second quarter of 2007, repo financing by broker-dealers had grown to 
be approximately $2.2 trillion, and broker-dealers relied on this market for approximately 
50 percent of their financing (Gorton and Metrick 2012, 5-6).8 During the beginning months 
of 2008, repo markets showed signs of severe contraction. Lenders had reacted to the events 
of late 2007 by increasing haircuts, demanding greater compensation for lending against 
riskier collateral, or refusing to make loans against certain types of collateral at all (Ibid.). 
Unsecured wholesale lending was curtailed, and term lending was shrinking rapidly with 
terms being greatly shortened. The decline in repos was sudden and sharp. Net funding to 
banks and broker-dealers fell from $2.2 trillion in 2007 Q2 to $900 billion in 2009 Q1 (Ibid.). 
The Fed first addressed these market disruptions by utilizing its traditional monetary policy 
tools and providing increased liquidity to depository institutions. As the new year 
progressed, however, it became more concerned about the impact that the market problems 
were having on other financial institutions and, in particular, on the primary dealers. 
Although programs such as the Term Auction Facility (TAF)9 (which had been initiated in 
December 2007) were thought to have been somewhat successful in maintaining a flow of 
liquidity in the markets, these early programs were also limited in that only depository 
institutions were eligible to borrow from them. Additionally, there was no guarantee that 
liquidity provided to depository institutions would then be lent on to primary dealers and 
other financial institutions. In this environment, the Fed introduced several measures to 
directly provide liquidity to the primary dealers.  
 
3. The Critical Role of the Primary Dealers 
Primary Dealers are those securities dealers that have been approved to buy Treasury 
securities directly from the Federal Reserve Bank of New York (FRBNY) and resell them to 
_____________________________________________________________________ 
provides bonds with a market equal to or greater than the amount of cash the depositor is providing. If the 
deposit is over-collateralized, there is said to be a “haircut.” E.g., if the borrower deposits $90 million dollars 
and the backing bonds are worth a market value of $100 million, then there is a 10 percent haircut” (Gorton 
and Metrick, 2012, 1, fn1). 
8 This amount continued to escalate and on March 4, 2008, primary dealers reported financing $4.5 trillion in 
assets with repos (Fleming, Hrung, and Keane, 2010, 5). 
9 At its inception, the Term Auction Facility made auction loans to depository institutions that were secured by 
investment-grade securities. The eligible collateral was later expanded.   
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the secondary market; they provide a vital role in monetary policy.10 As of November 30, 
2007, there were 20 primary dealers, including the largest U.S. investment banks.11  
By early 2008, the Fed had become very concerned about how the brewing financial crisis 
was affecting the primary dealers. Of particular concern were the five largest investment 
banks,12 which were experiencing funding difficulties as the wholesale lending markets 
seized. The investment banks followed business plans that were highly-leveraged,13 and they 
were dependent on overnight funding of hundreds of billions of dollars in commercial paper, 
repo, and securities lending to open for business.   
If the investment banks continued to experience rising funding costs and continued liquidity 
problems, there was the risk that one might fail and not only disturb a key monetary policy 
transmission channel but also have additional significant negative impacts on the financial 
industry as a whole. This was of particular concern because, by 2007, it was recognized that 
the financial industry had become far more interconnected and global than ever before.  
This was to be an important consideration in the Fed’s actions regarding the near collapse of 
Bear Stearns and in the significant ripple effects that the Lehman bankruptcy occasioned. In 
order to address these concerns, beginning in March 2008, the Fed implemented a series of 
programs designed to provide liquidity directly to the primary dealers. With the exception 
of the Single-Tranche Repo Lines under its OMOs, it had to rely on its seldom used emergency 
authority under Section 13(3) of the Federal Reserve Act (FRA)14 to do so. 
 
4. The Federal Reserve’s Powers and Section 13(3) of the FRA 
In its role as lender of last resort and keeper of monetary policy, the Fed has three basic tools: 
reserve requirements, the discount rate, and Open Market Operations (OMOs). The Fed sets 
_____________________________________________________________________ 
10 According to the FRBNY’s website, the primary dealers’ role includes (i) to participate consistently in open 
market operations to carry out U.S. monetary policy pursuant to the direction of the Federal Open Market 
Committee (FOMC) and (ii) to provide the FRBNY’s trading desk with market information and analysis helpful 
in the formulation and implementation of monetary policy. Primary dealers are also required to participate in 
all auctions of U.S. government debt and to make reasonable markets for the FRBNY when it transacts on behalf 
of its foreign official account-holders. 
11 See the Figure 8 for a list of primary dealers that borrowed from the PDCF, which is the same as the list as of 
November 30, 2007, with the exception of those three firms that became primary dealers late in the program 
as indicated in the note thereto. 
12 As of November 30, 2007, the five largest U.S. investment banks were all primary dealers through one 
subsidiary or another⎯ Bear, Stearns & Co., Inc.; Goldman Sachs & Co.; Lehman Brothers Inc.; Merrill Lynch 
Government Securities Inc.; and Morgan Stanley & Co. Incorporated. 
13 For example, Total assets/shareholders equity, a measure of leverage, rose from 28 percent at Bear Stearns 
in 2000 to 34 percent as of June 2007. Similar figures for Lehman Brothers were 26 percent to 31 percent. And 
by comparison, for Goldman Sachs, the most conservative of the major investment banks, from 18 percent to 
22 percent (Milliken Institute). 
14 Section 13(3) was enacted in 1932 out of concern that widespread bank failures would make it impossible 
for many firms to obtain loans, thus depressing the economy. It was used sparingly during the four years after 
the section was added and then not again until the events of 2008, 76 years later (Porter 2009, 502). See also 
discussion at page 8. 
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the amount of reserves that depository institutions are required to maintain with it to secure 
their operations. These funds are made available for loan to depository institutions through 
the Fed’s standing mechanism, the Discount Window, at rates established by the Fed. 
Through adjustments via its OMOs the Fed influences the demand for and amount of 
balances that depository institutions hold at the Fed, and therefore the federal funds rate, 
i.e., the interest rate at which depository institutions lend reserve balances to other 
depository institutions overnight. The Federal funds rate is also the rate at which the Fed 
provides loans to depository institutions through its Discount Window.  
Typically, pre-crisis OMOs were repo (occasionally reverse-repo) transactions undertaken 
by the Fed with primary dealer counterparties with maturities from one to seven days. These 
repo and reverse-repo transactions were undertaken to change the supply of reserves 
available to depositories and thus keep the federal funds rate at the monetary policy target 
interest rate determined by the Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC). 15 The collateral 
for OMOs repos were U.S. Treasury securities, agency securities, and agency mortgage-
backed securities.16 
Because authority to lend via the Discount Window does not extend to nondepository 
institutions, the Fed’s initial response to provide liquidity to nondepository institutions was 
based on its OMOs authority. As discussed below (See Single-Tranche Repos.), beginning in 
March 2008, the Federal Reserve conducted a series of 28-day repos to increase the 
availability of term financing to primary dealers, to alleviate the strains in the financial 
markets, and to support the flow of credit to U.S. households and businesses.(Fed PR, March 
7, 2008). However, as the financial crisis deepened and the need to deploy “significant force” 
to shore up the primary dealers and combat the financial crisis became evident, the Fed 
invoked Section 13(3) of the FRA. 
Section 13(3) of the FRA 
Section 13(3) of the FRA was a key authority relied upon by the Fed to enact programs for 
Primary Dealers. Before amendment by the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer 
Protection Act (Pub. L. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376) the section read in part as follows: 
In unusual and exigent circumstances, the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve 
System, by the affirmative vote of not less than five members, may authorize any 
Federal reserve bank, during such periods as the said board may determine, at rates 
established in accordance with the provisions of section 14, subdivision (d) of this 
Act, to discount for any individual, partnership, or corporation, notes, drafts, and bills 
of exchange when such notes, drafts, and bills of exchange are indorsed or otherwise 
secured to the satisfaction of the Federal reserve bank: Provided, That before 
discounting any such note, draft, or bill of exchange for an individual or a partnership 
or corporation the Federal reserve bank shall obtain evidence that such individual, 
_____________________________________________________________________ 
15 The Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System is responsible for the discount rate and reserve 
requirements, and the FOMC is responsible for open market operations 
16 In addition, prior to the crisis, the Fed periodically purchased U.S. Treasury securities to adjust the overall 
size of its balance sheet, typically in response to change in growth of currency. 
74




partnership, or corporation is unable to secure adequate credit accommodations 
from other banking institutions. All such discounts for individuals, partnerships, or 
corporations shall be subject to such limitations, restrictions, and federal regulations 
as the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System may prescribe. (12 U.S.C. § 
343 2006) 
Section 13(3) was enacted in 1932 so that the Fed would have some authority to respond if 
a rash of bank failures interrupted the ability of nonbanks to obtain credit, depressing the 
economy. The Fed could invoke Section13(3) to lend to any “individual, partnership, or 
corporation” if the other requirements of Section 13(3) were met. In the four years after the 
Section was added, the Fed made a total of 123 loans totaling just $1.5 million. Section 13(3) 
was not used again until 2008, 76 years later. (Porter 2009, 502). 
As shown in Figure 4, amendments to Section 13(3) adopted by Section 1101 of Dodd-Frank 
would, among other things, (i) require the Fed to obtain the approval of the Secretary of the 
Treasury prior to extending emergency credit under Section 13(3), (ii) require the Fed to 
disclose the justification and terms of any such program or facility within seven days after 
approval, and (iii) limit the Fed’s use of its emergency authority to participants in a program 
or facility with “broad-based eligibility” (a key component of which is that at least five or 
more persons or entities would be eligible to participate in such program or facility), and not 
lend to any insolvent company.17   
_____________________________________________________________________ 
17 The Fed’s new definition of broad-based eligibility reads as follows: 
 (4) Broad-based eligibility. (i) A program or facility established under this paragraph (d) must have broad-
based eligibility in accordance with terms established by the Board. (ii) For purposes of this paragraph (d), a 
program or facility has broad-based eligibility only if the program or facility is designed to provide liquidity to 
an identifiable market or sector of the financial system; (iii) A program or facility will not be considered to have 
broad-based eligibility for purposes of this paragraph (d) if: (A) The program or facility is designed for the 
purpose of assisting one or more specific companies avoid bankruptcy, resolution under Title II of Dodd-Frank 
Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (Pub. L. 111– 203, 12 U.S.C. 5381 et seq.), or any other Federal 
or State insolvency proceeding, including by removing assets from the balance sheet of one or more such 
company; (B) The program or facility is designed for the purpose of aiding one or more failing financial 
companies; or (C) Fewer than five persons or entities would be eligible to participate in the program or facility. 
(Fed Res Final Rule 2015)  
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Figure 4: Elements of invoking FRA Section 13(3) authority after Dodd-Frank Act 
Source: Fed Res Final Rule 2015. 
Based on the Fed’s definition of “broad-based” included in its final regulations implementing 
Section 1101 of Dodd-Frank, it does appear that the provision of liquidity to the primary 
dealers during the crisis would have passed muster. Although a relatively small group, the 
primary dealers can definitely be said to be “an identifiable market or sector of the financial 
system.” Indeed, they can be said to stand in pivotal positions in many markets as key 
market-makers and or intermediaries, and they consistently number five or more.  
 
1. Credit is to be extended only in “unusual and exigent circumstances.”  
2. The Board must act by the affirmative vote of at least five of its members. 
3. The extension of credit to be indorsed or otherwise secured to the satisfaction of 
the Reserve Bank.  
4. The lending Reserve Bank must obtain evidence before extending the credit that 
the borrower “individual, partnership, or corporation” is unable to secure 
adequate credit accommodations from other banking institutions.  
The following provisions were added by the Dodd-Frank Act 
1. The Board must obtain the approval of the Secretary of the Treasury prior to 
extending the emergency credit. 
2. Within seven days after the approval of such a program or facility, the Board must 
disclose the justification for and the terms of such program. 
3. The program or facility must be one with broad-based eligibility in that it is not 
structured to remove assets from the balance sheet of one or more companies, 
not established for the purpose of assisting one or more companies to avoid 
bankruptcy, resolution under Title II of the Dodd-Frank Act, or any other Federal 
or State insolvency proceeding, and not less than five persons would be eligible to 
utilize it.  
4. Credit may not be extended to any person or entity that is insolvent or to any 
person or entity that is borrowing for the purpose of lending the proceeds of the 
loan to a person or entity that is insolvent. 
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Based on the market situation that then existed, the Fed repeatedly found the “unusual and 
exigent circumstances” required for its reliance on Section 13(3). Minutes of the FOMC 
meeting on March 10, 2008, approving the TSLF indicate—“The section 13(3) legal basis for 
this operation requires an affirmation that market conditions are significantly impaired. If 
we couldn’t honestly make that affirmation, our legal basis would disappear” (FOMC Trans, 
March 10, 2008, 14). Facts recited to support this conclusion include: 
“CHAIRMAN BERNANKE. . . We live in a very special time. We have seen, as you know, 
significant deterioration in term funding markets and more broadly in the financial 
markets in the last few days. Some of this is credit deterioration, certainly, given 
increased expectations of recession; but there also seem to be some self-feeding 
liquidity dynamics at work as well. So the question before us is whether there are 
actions we can take, other than monetary policy, to break or mitigate this adverse 
dynamic.” (Ibid.)  
Minutes of the Board of Governors meeting held on March 16, 2008, also reflect a similar 
finding in connection with approving the PDCF:  
New credit facility for primary securities dealers. Given the unusual and exigent 
circumstances, the Board authorized the New York Reserve Bank to establish a facility 
to extend credit to primary securities dealers. . . .  
The Board’s decision to establish a facility for primary securities dealers was based 
on recent, rapidly changing developments. These developments demonstrated that 
there had been impairment of a broad range of financial markets in which primary 
dealers finance themselves. The available evidence also indicated that the dealers 
might have difficulty obtaining necessary financing for their operations from 
alternative sources. 
On September 14, 2008, the Board further found that such unusual and exigent 
circumstances had continued since its March 16th determination and relied on this finding to 
authorize major changes to the PDCF and the TSLF (Fed Res Bd Gov Mins September 14, 
2008). (See Also Porter, 2009, 502-509, which provides an analytical discussion of the Fed’s 
utilization of Section 13(3) during the financial crisis.)  
While some commentators have been critical of some of the actions that the Fed took to 
combat the financial crisis in reliance on Section 13(3), its actions to provide funding to the 
primary dealers through the PDCF and the TSLF have generally not been criticized. This is 
likely because these facilities are more in line with the Fed’s monetary policy role and also 
because they involved lending in a manner closely similar to its traditional OMOs. (See Figure 
5.) The Fed has received the most criticism when it relied on Section 13(3) to provide 
liquidity to a specific firm (such as Bear Stearns, AIG, or Citicorp), or to indirectly purchase 
assets, such as in the case of the Commercial Paper Funding Facility (Mehra 2010.)  
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5. Primary Dealer Support: Single-Tranche Repo Loans 
For much of the early months of 2008, the Fed staff considered how to provide liquidity to 
the primary dealers. The repo markets were under tremendous pressure and, since the U.S. 
financial system had become less bank-centric, with the evolution of the wholesale lending 
market, a liquidity problem impacting nonbanks (investment banks, insurance companies, 
and hedge funds) might create a problem that the Fed could not immediately address with 
its traditional monetary policy tools. Moreover, the highly-developed interconnectivity 
between financial institutions and markets also meant that a problem with one significant 
player or key market could lead to system-wide issues (FOMC Trans, March 10, 2008, 5). 
 
*Initial terms shown. Criteria may have changed during the program. Source: Fleming 2012, 164. 
 
Open Market Operation Repos 
The Single-Tranche Repos were a series of OMOs transactions conducted under Section 14 
of the FRA (the Fed’s basic authority to conduct open market operations). These operations 
were not an emergency lending program authorized by section 13(3) of the Federal Reserve 
Act. 
Figure 5: Details of the Federal Reserve’s Liquidity Programs for Primary Dealers,  
2007-09 
 OMOs Repos TSLF PDCF 








Auction loans against 
eligible collateral 
Term* 28 days 28 days Overnight 
Eligible Collateral* 
Treasuries, Agency debt 





including private label 
ABS 
OMOs-eligible 
collateral. Beginning in 
September 2008, any 
collateral accepted in 
the tri-party repo 
market. 
Rate DW Primary Credit rate Single Price 
DW Primary Credit rate 
+ High frequency rate 
Authority Sec. 14 Sec. 14 + Sec. 13(3) Sec. 13(3) 
Size: Total ($billions)* 100 200 100 
Size Initial offering 
($billions) 15 50/tranche 50 
Availability Weekly Weekly Daily 
Purpose 
Provide liquidity to PDs 
in need 
Provide liquidity to 
PDs/Address collateral 
problem and Stimulate 
lending markets 
Provide liquidity to PDs 
in need/Backstop the 
repo markets 
Impact on Reserves? Y N Y 
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As part of its ongoing open market operations to maintain the Federal funds rate near the 
target, the Fed provided overnight repos to primary dealers. Such operations were a small 
portion of the dealers’ overall funding needs, but the existence of the mechanism provided 
the Fed with a readily available and proven mechanism for introducing additional liquidity 
into the system. The repos were arranged through the primary dealers’ clearing banks, 
which held custody of the collateral and revalued it each day. Occasionally the Fed had also 
used term repos, usually with 14-day terms, to relieve strains in collateral markets during 
periods of market turmoil and during  “flights to quality” when many investors retreat from 
assets that are no longer considered “safe.”. 
On March 7, 2008, the Federal Reserve announced that its Open Market Trading Desk would 
conduct a series of single-tranche term repurchase transactions (Single-Tranche Repos) to 
provide longer-term funding to primary dealers for up to a $100 billion. These repos would 
be in addition to its overnight repo transactions, increasing the liquidity available to primary 
dealers (Fed. Res. PR, Mar. 7, 2008). While the Fed had arranged single-tranche repos in 
other times, this move was an indication of how serious it considered the contraction in the 
funding markets facing the primary dealers.  
The Single-Tranche Repos differed from conventional OMOs repos in several ways:  
• Single-tranche auctions in which primary dealers could offer any combination of 
eligible collateral for up to the full amount available provided the primary dealers 
greater flexibility to finance less-liquid types of collateral.  
• Repos were for 28-day terms instead of overnight, addressing the reluctance of the 
market to provide longer term funding. 
• The Fed would accept any of the types of securities that were eligible as collateral in 
its conventional repo operations—Treasuries, Federal Agency debt or Federal 
Agency mortgage-backed securities.18  
The transactions were conducted through competitive auctions at market rates. Primary 
dealers were not required to bid in the auctions; however, they all were required to 
acknowledge the operation by connecting their systems. This worked against any perceived 
stigma that might have caused resistance.  
The Single-Tranche Repo program was well received, providing some relief to the 
constrained agency MBS market. Maximum outstanding under the program rose to $80 
billion, during April 2008. The last auction was conducted in December 2008, and by the end 
of January 2009 use of the facility had ceased. By comparison, the maximum amount 
outstanding under the TSLF reached $236 billion, and under the PDCF it reached $147 billion 
(Fleming 2012, 164, FRBNY website). 
_____________________________________________________________________ 
18 Acceptable Federal Agency securities here include debt issued by the Federal Home Loan Mortgage 
Corporation (FHLMC), the Federal National Mortgage Association (FNMA), the Federal Home Loan Banks, and 
mortgage-backed securities issued by the FHLMC, FNMA, and the Government National Mortgage Association. 
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6. The Term Securities Lending Facility (TSLF) 
The Term Securities Lending Facility (TSLF) was approved by the FOMC19 on March 10, 2008 
and announced on March 11, 2008. The first auction was held on March 27, 2008. As shown 
in Figure 6, when paired with the PDCF (discussed below) the TSLF made the Fed’s liquidity 
programs for primary dealers closely mirror those offered to depository institutions—
Discount Window lending and the Term Auction Facility (securities-based lending).20  
Figure 6: Comparison of the Federal Reserve’s Liquidity Programs for Depository 
Institutions and Primary Dealers, 2007-10 
*Initial terms shown. Criteria may have changed during the program. Source: Fleming 2012, 164. 
Two key reasons cited by the Fed for implementing the TSLF were: (1) that the alarming 
deterioration in the lending cycle had become a danger to the monetary policy transmission 
mechanism and, (2) that what were systemic liquidity issues risked becoming systemic 
solvency issues and jeopardizing even more financial intermediaries (FOMC Trans, March 10 
2008, 5).  
The TSLF was a security-for-security lending facility very similar to the daily OMOs securities 
lending operations and thus, was familiar to the primary dealers. Also, because the TSLF 
_____________________________________________________________________ 
19 The Federal Open Markets Committee is responsible for the Fed’s OMO operations. 
20 Just days after the announcement of the TSLF, but prior to the first auction being held, the markets roiled 
with the near collapse of Bear Stearns and its announced sale to JP Morgan. Concern about the market’s reaction 
to the news about Bear Stearns prompted the Fed to suddenly announce, on March 14, 2008, the Primary Dealer 
Credit Facility (PDCF), a new, third, program for providing direct loans to primary dealers. (See page 16 for a 
discussion of the PDCF.)  
Eligible 
Participants 
Name of Program Purpose of Program Date Announced 
Depository 
Institutions 
Discount Window Provided collateralized loans 
secured by illiquid collateral 
OMOs 
Ongoing 
 Term Auction Facility Provided collateralized loans 
secured by illiquid collateral 
December 12, 
2007 
 Asset-backed Commercial 
Paper Money Market 
Mutual Fund Liquidity 
Facility 
Provided funds to purchase 
ABCP from MMMFs 
September 18, 
2008 
Primary Dealers Single-Tranche Open 
Market Operations 
Provided secured loans in 
exchange for OMOs-eligible 
collateral 
March 7, 2008 
 Term Securities Lending 
Facility 
Loaned Treasuries in 
exchange for OMOs-eligible 
collateral and illiquid 
collateral* 
March 11, 2008 
 Primary Dealer Credit 
Facility 
Provided loans secured by 
illiquid collateral 
March 16, 2008 
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swapped bonds for bonds, it enabled the Fed to sidestep issues regarding the impact on its 
reserves that would have had to be addressed if instead the Fed had chosen to significantly 
scale up its cash funding programs.21 There was also the concern that given the expected size 
of the program, $200 billion, the need to sterilize its effects might have given rise to negative 
back-end effects on the pricing markets.  
The Vicious Dynamic and Reversing the Cycle 
Beyond providing liquid securities directly to the primary dealers, it was thought that the 
TSLF would also reduce liquidity risk in the markets overall. As the crisis developed, repo 
financing by broker-dealers began to fail. Net funding to banks and broker-dealers fell from 
$2.2 trillion in 2007 Q2 to $900 billion in 2009 Q1 (Gorton and Metrick 2012). The Fed 
targeted this dangerous cycle and hoped that lending against Treasuries would help slow or 
even reverse “the dynamic process of reduced liquidity, greater price volatility, higher 
haircuts, margin calls, and forced liquidation” that was ongoing (FOMC Trans, March 10, 
2008, 6). This debilitating cycle was explained to the FOMC as follows: 
“That dynamic goes something like this: Asset price declines—say, triggered by 
deterioration in the outlook—lead to margin calls. Some highly leveraged firms are 
unable to meet these calls. Dealers respond by liquidating collateral. This puts 
downward pressure on asset prices and increases price volatility. Dealers raise 
haircuts further to compensate for the heightened volatility and the reduced liquidity 
in the market. This, in turn, puts more pressure on other leveraged investors. A 
vicious circle ensues of higher haircuts, fire sales, lower prices, higher volatility, and 
still lower prices, and financial intermediaries start to break as a liquidity crisis 
potentially leads to insolvency when assets are sold at fire sale prices.” (Ibid., 4-5) 
The TSLF permitted dealers to swap illiquid mortgage–backed collateral that the market was 
refusing to loan against for Treasury securities, providing the dealers with collateral that 
they could then use to secure funding in the wholesale lending market. This would better 
enable the primary dealers to finance their balance sheets, which would stabilize the primary 
dealers and make them more willing to make markets across a range of securities. Better 
market-making would increase the value of the securities and increase the market’s 
willingness to accept other types of collateral, reviving a range of markets. The resulting 
increased liquidity would result in lower haircuts generally (Ibid., 6). 
Features of the TSLF 
The TSLF was modelled after the Term Auction Facility (TAF)22, which the Fed introduced in 
December 2007 for depository institutions, and also after the daily OMOs securities lending 
_____________________________________________________________________ 
21 “Moreover, as both programs are scaled up [the cash-based TAF program for $100 billion and the Single-
Tranche Repo Loans for $100 billion], there is a large impact on reserves that must be offset by Treasury 
redemptions, sales, or reverse repurchase operations. Frankly, there are limits to our ability to adjust our 
portfolio quickly without our actions becoming a source of disruption to financial markets” (FOMC March 10, 
2008, 5).  
22 Under the TAF, which was authorized pursuant to the Fed’s primary monetary powers and role as lender of 
last resort, the Fed provided cash loans to depository institutions that were secured by illiquid collateral that 
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operations23, but with some significant differences. Although with the TSLF, the Fed sought 
to address the same market problem as it had with the TAF, it also had as an objective 
reviving the wholesale lending markets. Thus, the TSLF provided Treasury securities, rather 
than cash, in exchange for other less-liquid securities. The primary dealers received 
collateral that they could presumably utilize in market borrowings. (See Figure 6 for a 
comparison of Fed programs for depository institutions and primary dealers.) 
Key features of the TSLF included: 
• Available only to primary dealers who could swap their less-liquid collateral for 
Treasury securities held in the Fed’s System Open Market Account (SOMA). 
• Loans were for periods of 28 days.  
• To access the TSLF, primary dealers bid a fee via a single-prove auction with a 
minimum set by the FRBNY.24 
• Dealers could submit up to two bids. The minimum bid was $10 million, each bid 
could be for no more than 20 percent of the offering amount, and each dealer could 
be awarded no more than 20 percent of the offering amount.  
• The auctions were single-priced, so that accepted dealer bids were awarded at the 
same stop-out rate, which was the lowest rate at which bids are accepted.  
• Treasury collateral was allocated to dealers on a pro rata basis, so that a dealer 
awarded 10 percent of the offering amount received a 10 percent share of each 
Treasury security offered. 
• The Fed reserved the right to substitute lent general collateral each day so as to avoid 
providing collateral that may trade with scarcity value in the repo market.  
(See Fleming, Hrung, and Keane 2010 for further details regarding the operation of the TSLF 
auctions.)  
Eligible Collateral 
To mitigate credit risk to the Fed, TSLF transactions, similar to OMOs securities lending, were 
fully collateralized with appropriate haircuts applied. However, because TSLF lending was 
for longer maturities and involved less liquid collateral, the program was designed to ensure 
_____________________________________________________________________ 
the market would no longer lend against. (See Wiggins et al. 2015 for a discussion of the Fed’s lending and 
credit programs for depository institutions.) 
23 “What are the differences between the SOMA Securities Lending program and the TSLF? 
The SOMA Securities Lending program offers specific Treasury securities held by SOMA for loan against 
Treasury GC on an overnight basis. Dealers bid competitively in a multiple-price auction held every day at noon. 
The TSLF will offer Treasury GC held by SOMA for a 28-day term. Dealers will bid competitively in single-price 
auctions held weekly and borrowers will pledge program-eligible collateral” (FRBNY, Term Securities Lending 
Facility: Frequently Asked Questions, June 25, 2009). 
24 The minimum fee for Schedule 1 and Schedule 2 auctions was 10 and 25 basis points (per annum), 
respectively. 
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that loans were over-collateralized. The market value of eligible collateral was posted on a 
daily basis, and dealers would be required to make collateral substitutions over the term of 
a loan if the pledged collateral deteriorated in value or fell out of the eligible collateral pool25 
(Fleming, Hrung, and Keane 2010, 7-8).  
TSLF eligible collateral consisted of two types, (i) all collateral eligible for Fed OMOs tri-
party repurchase agreements—Treasury securities, Agency debt, and Agency MBS 
(Schedule 1), and (ii) all Schedule 1 collateral, investment grade corporate securities, 
municipal securities, MBS, and asset-backed securities (Schedule 2). Auctions were to be 
run for separate tranches of Schedule 1 and Schedule 2 collateral . Initially, $100 billion 
was allocated for each type of collateral, with initial auctions pegged at $50 billion each 
(FOMC Transcript March 10, 2008, 7-9). 
The Fed chose to include mortgage-backed securities in addition to the already eligible 
Schedule 1 collateral to increase the impact of the program (Ibid., 6). While they did think 
that a TSLF limited to Schedule 1 collateral would produce a positive response (as had the 
TAF, which had a similar constraint on the collateral it would accept for loans), it was also 
thought that including the large market of private label mortgage-backed securities (MBS) 
could have an even greater impact on monetary policy transmission mechanism and could 
also produce significant spillover benefits (Ibid.). Reasons cited for not further expanding 
the eligible collateral beyond that of Schedule 2 were (i) that other markets, such as 
commercial-backed mortgage securities and corporate or municipal bonds, were not under 
the same high degree of duress, and (ii) that to include other asset classes would have 
increased the operational complexity and risk of the program, for example, by compelling 
additional tranched auctions (Ibid., 6-7).  
Prior to the first TSLF auction, however, after consultation with market participants 
(presumably including the primary dealers), the Fed decided to base the first auction 
exclusively on Schedule 2 collateral. It also expanded the list of Schedule 2 collateral to 
include agency collateralized-mortgage obligations (CMOs) and AAA/Aaa-rated 
commercial mortgage-backed securities (CMBS), in addition to the previously 
announced AAA/Aaa-rated private-label residential mortgage backed securities (RMBS) 
and OMOs-eligible collateral (FRBNY PR, March 20, 2008). The first auction size was also 
raised to $75 billion (Ibid.). 
During the first weeks of September 2008, officials of the Fed and Treasury Department 
were actively entrenched in assisting Lehman Brothers and AIG in finding strategies for 
survival. The efforts on behalf of Lehman would ultimately fail , and it would, on 
September 15th, declare the largest bankruptcy in U.S. history. AIG would be saved only 
by the largest government bailout in U.S. history. 
_____________________________________________________________________ 
25 The TSLF contained other provisions designed to manage collateral risk. Collateral that was on watch for 
downgrades was not accepted. Also, non-agency MBS securities had to be rated at least AAA-rated and then 
could not be private-label MBS with CDO-type structures and characteristics. If securities accepted as collateral 
were put on review for downgrade, the Fed could demand that the borrower replace them with other securities 
acceptable to the Fed (FOMC Transcript, March 10, 2008, 6-9).  
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Realizing that these events would likely increase the stress on the markets, on 
September 14th, the Fed announced that it was again expanding Schedule 2 eligible 
collateral to include all investment-grade debt securities. (It also made a related 
significant expansion to collateral eligible under the PDCF.) Additionally, the Schedule 2 
bi-weekly auctions were changed to occur on a weekly basis, and the amount allocated 
to the Schedule 2 auctions was increased to a total of $150 billion.26 The amount 
allocated to Schedule 1 auctions remained at $50 billion (Fed. Reserve PR, September 
14, 2008). Every auction for Schedule 1 collateral was to be for $25 billion. Schedule 2 
auctions ranged from $35 billion to $75 billion (Fleming, Hrung, and Keane 2008, 13). 
Because the TSLF was a security-for-security swap, its operation did not expand the 
Fed’s balance sheet or require sterilizing of its effects. However, it was recognized that 
the Fed was potentially absorbing increased credit risk as the SOMA portfolio accepted 
lower-quality collateral (FOMC Trans, March 10, 2008, 7). 
Managing Counterparty Risk 
By limiting participation in the TSLF to the primary dealers the Fed limited it to a small, select 
group of institutions that it had vetted, so counterparty risk was thought to be at minimum 
(Ibid., 8). The Fed also reserved the right to exclude any primary dealer from participation 
in the TSLF (a decision to be made by the FRBNY which administered the program). This was 
an authority that the Fed traditionally retained with respect to its OMOs and which it had on 
occasion used to exclude primary dealers who were failing (e.g., Drexel), or whose market 
conduct was inappropriate (e.g., Salomon Brothers).  
Legal Authority 
There were two basis of authority for the TSLF. The first was Section 14 of the Federal 
Reserve Act, which provides for OMOs activities and which supported the program since a 
main objective was to maintain the critical function that the primary dealers played in the 
monetary transmission channel and the market for U.S. securities.27 All of the Schedule 1 
collateral transactions were clearly permitted under this section. The Fed staff also 
considered Schedule 2 collateral transactions to be justified to the extent that they intended 
on improving the market for U.S. securities (FOMC Trans, March 10, 2008, 9). However, given 
the secondary objective embodied in the TSLF⎯that of providing liquidity to the primary 
dealers⎯ the Fed also relied on Section 13(3)28. 
_____________________________________________________________________ 
26 Between late March and September 2008, the NYFed conducted weekly auctions alternating between 
Schedule 1 and Schedule 2 collateral (NYFED PR, March 24, 2009). 
27 “The TSLF is intended to promote liquidity in the financing markets for Treasury and other collateral and 
thus to foster the functioning of financial markets more generally” (Bd of Gov Fed Res PR, March 11, 2008).  
28 “MR. ALVAREZ. Yes. President Hoenig, you are correct. We are relying in part on section 14, the open market 
operations piece, even for accepting collateral that is not section 14 collateral because it does have an effect in 
improving the market for U.S. government securities, but there is a very strong component of this that is 
providing liquidity to the primary dealers, and to satisfy that we are relying on section 13(3) authority” (FOMC 
Transcript, March 10, 2008, 9). 
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Impact of the TSLF 
At its peak in October 2008, there was $230 billion in Treasury securities outstanding under 
the TSLF. The TSLF was extended several times and auctions against Schedule 1 collateral 
were suspended as of July 1, 2009. The last TSLF auction against Schedule 2 collateral closed 
on February 1, 2010. All TSLF securities loans were repaid in full, with interest, according to 
their terms. 
While there has not been much research regarding the effectiveness of the TSLF, some 
researchers have concluded that the TSLF was successful in that it operated as intended by 
providing increased liquidity to those dealers that needed it, and also by stimulating the 
lending markets. Auctions had a high level of dealer participation indicating that the TSLF 
was filling a real need. This may also indicate that the TSLF’s design mitigated stigma of the 
type associated with the Discount Window that made banks reluctant to use it. Later 
undersubscribing of TSLF auctions indicated possible improved market conditions and that 
liquidity needs had lessened or were being met elsewhere (Fleming, Hrung, and Keane 2008, 
13). 
Researchers have also found that the TSLF’s operations were associated with a narrowing of 
repo spreads between less-liquid and more-liquid collateral, which is to be expected. When 
the volume of Treasuries in the market increases, related financing rates decline. The 
auctions also had the effect of causing rates on lower quality collateral to decline. Also 
changes in the amount outstanding under the facility correlated negatively with changes in 
repo spreads (Ibid., 16).  
It should, however, be noted that the TSLF was only part of a bigger multi-faceted solution. 
It successfully mitigated part of the liquidity problem suffered by primary dealers by 
addressing the issue of restricted collateral requirements. The PDCF and the Single-Tranche 
Repos addressed another part of that problem, an inability to fund repos. Yet, the primary 
dealers were only part of their overall organizations, which had additional liquidity and 









7. The Primary Dealer Credit Facility 
On Friday, March 14, 2008, the Fed announced that it would provide to Bear Stearns, the fifth 
largest U.S. investment bank and a primary dealer, up to $85 billion in bridge funding 
through JP Morgan Chase Bank N.A. so that Bear could continue to pay its debts and explore 
options with other financial institutions that might enable it to avoid bankruptcy (Fed 
Reserve website). The Fed considered what impact this might have on the markets given the 
severe strains already impacting the tri-party repo market, among others, and decided that, 
notwithstanding its announcement of up to $300 billion in liquidity in the prior ten days,29 
to calm the markets it would have to provide liquidity in a more impactful manner.  
The Prime Dealer Credit Facility (PDCF) had been under consideration by the Fed for some 
time prior to its announcement as it had been exploring whether it could provide to the 
primary dealers a standing overnight facility similar to how the Discount Window operated 
for depository institutions. The PDCF was established under Section 13(3) of the FRA and 
operated through the existing triparty clearance system that the Fed and primary dealers 
used for OMOs repos. It was to provide a backup source of funds for entities that self-
determined that such funding was needed and, like the Discount Window, would be available 
daily, unlike the term loans under the TSLF or the Single-Tranche Repos.  
PDCF loans were fully secured by eligible collateral, applicable haircuts, and full recourse to 
the borrower. The loans were offered at a Primary Credit rate at the FRBNY, the same rate 
that depository institutions paid at the Discount Window. 
Eligible Collateral 
In March 2008, primary dealers’ repo financing (both overnight and longer-term) totaled 
more than $4.5 trillion (Adrian, Burke, McAndrews 2009, 6). This amount would decrease as 
dealers reduced their balance sheets by selling assets and would stand at $2.5 trillion as of 
September 2008. As shown in Figure 7, by then, overnight repos had increasingly become a 









29 The Single-Tranche Repo Loan program ($100 billion) was announced on March 7, and the TSLF (up to $200 
billion) was announced on March 11.  
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Figure 7: Overnight Repos as a Percentage of Total Primary Dealer Repo Financing, 
January 5, 2005-July 22, 2009 
 
Source: Federal Reserve Bank of New York; author’s calculations; Adrian, Burke, and McAndrews 
2009, 3. 
Originally, eligible collateral under the PDCF was limited to only investment-grade 
securities. However, in September 2008, with the tri-party repo markets further stressed by 
the rumors that Lehman Brothers, a major participant, might file for bankruptcy, the Fed 
became concerned about the severe stress in the markets and the possible impact on the two 
major clearing banks, Bank of New York and JP Morgan Chase. Each morning the clearing 
banks unwound trillions of dollars in repos and assumed the risk of the transactions until 
the funds and the collateral were redeposited with it at the end of the day. If Lehman failed 
during midday, the clearing banks would be at risk for millions in losses and the effects 
would spread far and be traumatic to an already weakened market. The effects would be 
similar if the clearing banks refused to unwind Lehman’s repos. Either way, counterparties 
would be forced to sell collateral quickly to avoid losses.  
On September 14, 2008, the Fed significantly extended the list of collateral eligible under the 
PDCF to include all of the types of instruments that could be pledged in the tri-party repo 
systems of the two major clearing banks. This range was greater than under either the TSLF 
or the OMOs and included less-liquid types of collateral, such as below-investment-grade 
corporate debt and equities, whole loans, and trust receipts (Bd Gov Fed Res PR, September 
14, 2008). The move signaled that should a traumatic event occur, the Fed was prepared to 
substitute itself as counterparty and lend against the collateral, hopefully preventing it from 
being sold at fire-sale prices. This was made administratively feasible by utilizing the existing 
tri-party repo infrastructure. The clearing banks received the funds from the Fed and the 
securities from the borrower and each day unwound the repos and repriced the collateral.  
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Other Design Features 
Unlike the TSLF, the PDCF was clearly designed to meet the needs of particular institutions 
on a particular day and as such suffered some element of stigma similar to other facilities 
such as the Discount Window (See Wiggins and Metrick 2015A discussing the issue of 
stigma). Yet, there was also a risk that as circumstances worsened primary dealers might 
overuse the facility. Therefore, several design features sought to demotivate primary dealers 
from using the PDCF for financing unnecessarily, as a primary funding source, and to mitigate 
against moral hazard. 
• The lending rate was the Discount Rate, which was in excess of the target Federal 
Funds rate and which was a rate in excess of the overnight repo rate for most 
collateral.30 
 
• The NYFed counselled borrowers on usage and sometimes urged them to first access 
market means. 
 
• A frequency-based penalty fee was applied after every 30, then 45 days of use, and 
escalated at each interval. 
 
Additionally, through an agreement with the SEC, which was the primary regulator for 
dealers that were investment banks, the Fed and the SEC applied increased prudential 
scrutiny to the borrower’s operations. FRBNY personnel were sent into the firms’ offices to 
gather information that would inform the Fed’s judgments of the firms as borrowers should 
the need arise.   
Use and Impact of the PDCF 
When first instituted, the PDCF was heavily used, primarily by Bear Stearns. Usage peaked 
at $40 billion in April 2008 and steadily declined afterwards. Following Bear’s acquisition by 
JP Morgan, the facility was largely dormant until September 2008 when Lehman filed for 
bankruptcy. On September 17, 2008, usage spiked from zero to $59.7 billion, evidence that 
it was doing what it was intended to do (Adrian, Burke and McAndrews 2009, 7). 
As shown in Figure 8, usage of the PDCF peaked at $140 billion in October 2008. Data also 
show that the facility was frequently used by many primary dealers. One dealer (Citibank 
Global Markets Inc.), accessed the facility 174 times, and another (Barclays Capital Inc.) 
borrowed a maximum amount of $47.9 billion, followed closely by Morgan Stanley & Co. at 
_____________________________________________________________________ 
30 It is worth noting, however, that overnight repo is largely price insensitive. Lenders may use haircuts for 
lower quality collateral, but they don’t really adjust rates much for either collateral or counterparty risk. Risk 
Management for tri-party lenders is to run; they don’t raise process first. At the time the PDCF was put in place, 
there was little tri-party market for private MBS collateral, so it is hard to know if the rate was truly a penalty. 
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$47.6 billion total borrowings. (See Figure 9). Usage steadily declined during the next nine 
months bottoming out in early 2009. 
Figure 8: Discount Window and Primary Dealer Credit Facility Usage, January 1, 2008-July 
15, 2009 
 
Source: Federal Reserve Statistical Release H.4.1, “Factors Affecting Reserve Balances of 
Depository Institutions and Condition Statement of Federal Reserve Banks.”; Adrian, Burke & 
McAndrews, 2009, 7. 
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Figure 9: Primary Dealer Credit Facility Borrowings 
*Amounts in billions of dollars. Excludes other broker-dealer credit (that is, lending to the 
London-based subsidiaries of broker-dealers). Not listed are dealers that never borrowed 
from the facility, two of which (Greenwich Capital Markets, Inc. and HSBC Securities [USA] 
Inc)] were primary dealers throughout the program, and three of which (Jefferies & 
Company, Inc.; Nomura Securities International, Inc.; and RBC Capital Markets Corp.) 
became primary dealers late in the life of the program, in June or July 2009.  
Source: Fleming 2012, 164. 
Another indication of the PDCF’s effectiveness is that credit default swaps for the primary 
dealers eligible for the facility fell for three months following the creation of the PDCF, as 
shown in Figure 10, signaling that the market perceived the firms to be less risky with the 
facility available (Adrian, Burke, and McAndrews 2009, 7). Once the financing markets 
improved, the dealers sought out less costly funding, and utilization of the facility declined. 
The facility was closed in February 2010, and all loans were repaid in full, with interest.  







Citigroup Global Markets Inc. 174 10.1 18.6 
Morgan Stanley & Co. Inc. 122 11.2 47.6 
Banc of America Securities LLC 118 5.4 11.0 
Mizuho Securities USA Inc. 108 0.4 2.2 
Merrill Lynch Government 
Securities Inc. 
99 15.0 33.2 
Countrywide Securities Corp. 75 1.0 1.7 
Barclays Capital Inc. 74 5.5 47.9 
Bear, Stearns & Co., Inc. 69 13.9 28.5 
Cantor Fitzgerald & Co. 61 0.5 0.7 
Goldman, Sachs & Co. 52 8.3 18.0 
BNP Paribas Securities Corp. 43 1.5 4.6 
Lehman Brothers Inc. 10 8.3 28.0 
UBS Securities LLC 8 4.4 6.5 
JPMorgan Securities Inc. 3 1.0 3.0 
Credit Suisse Securities (USA) LLC 2 0.8 1.0 
Daiwa Securities America Inc. 1 0.4 0.4 
Deutsche Bank Securities Inc. 1 0.5 0.5 
Dresdner Kleinwort Securities 
LLC 
1 0.1 0.1 
All primary dealers 1,021 7.2 47.9 
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Figure 10: Credit Default Swap Spreads, January 1, 2008-July 20, 2009 
 
Source: Datastream, Adrian, Burke, and McAndrews, 2009, 7. 
The PDCF provided funding to primary dealers at a time of severe liquidity constraints and 
disruption in the repo market. In that regard, it served the purpose for which it was intended. 
The fact that the dealers so heavily used the PDFC with its costly funding is some indication 
that less costly funding was not readily available elsewhere. And the design held up as usage 
declined as the repo markets recovered. However, the PDCF was just part of the Fed’s 
solution to the liquidity crisis that impacted primary dealers. It took all of the targeted 
programs and, ultimately, recapitalization to correct the liquidity and solvency problems 
plaguing the financial system.  
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